IDEOLOGICAL DEVELOPERS AND THE FORMATION OF LOCAL DEVELOPMENT POLICY: THE CASE OF INNER-CITY PRESERVATION IN TEL AVIV

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ABSTRACT: *This article studies the role of* ideological developers *(IDs) in the formation and implementation of local development policy. The IDs are developers whose motivation is ideological as opposed to financial, and they initiate ideas rather than plans and projects. Based on a case study regarding inner-city preservation, we claim that in Tel Aviv, IDs have much leverage on local decision making. The IDs are individuals with high personal capital, who focus on an issue that it is not championed by existing civil groups. As the IDs seek out influential routes to policy makers, they build* circumstantial coalitions. *Through these limited and conditional partnerships with administrators and other influential actors, the IDs apply pressure and advance their specific cause.*

In June 2003, the city of Tel Aviv was granted an unusual honor when the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) nominated the White City of Tel Aviv as a World Heritage site. The inscription ceremony was the highlight of a gradual process that began 20 years before with an appreciation for the city's buildings built in the Modern style throughout the 1930s and 1940s. In addition, the ceremony indicated that the preservation initiative had become formal policy, supported by the local government and planning administration.

Promoting the preservation of Tel Aviv's inner city is not self-evident. Israel's built environment includes many sites dating back centuries, representing religious, tourist, archeological, and historic significance. Many of them are located in lively cities and form the backdrop of everyday life, as is the case in Jerusalem, Nazareth, Tiberius, and Beer Sheva. Yet, only a few undergo comprehensive preservation,[1] and even fewer are designated World Heritage. Moreover, for many years, the city of Tel Aviv itself ignored what was to become an important cultural asset. By the middle of the 1980s, hardly a dozen people were aware of the importance of the Modern International Style commonly associated with the Bauhaus legacy in Tel Aviv;[2] in the 1990s, the

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city had not yet formed a strategy for dealing with these buildings, let alone prepared a plan or established a procedure for their preservation. Chance circumstances, however, brought together the right people and the right opportunities to lead to the creation of the preservation plan, which focused international attention on the unique architectural fabric of Tel Aviv. In this paper, we claim that the formation of the preservation policy in Tel Aviv illustrates the contribution of *ideological developers* and of the *circumstantial coalitions* they form as a component of contemporary governance. (An *ideological developer* is a term we coined to describe a developer whose motivation is ideological as opposed to financial. Unlike the property developer, who promotes plans and projects, the ideological developer promotes viewpoints and policies.) We mainly focus on the ideological developers' role in influencing the local government's agenda and crystallizing local development policy.

We attempt to contribute to the discussion concerning civil groups' interactions with local government by shedding light on this particular urban actor, the ideological developer, and her/his efforts toward establishing a circumstantial coalition. Recent studies express growing interest in the process of governance, which reflects transformation in the urban political arena resulting from structural economic and political changes. In particular, urban governance is concerned with "informal arrangements by which public bodies and private interests function together to make and carry out governing decisions" (Stone, 1989, p. 179), and looks at the emergence, functioning, and implications of such formal and informal cooperation. In line with this, we follow the actions of seemingly nonassociated actors who have taken up a particular development idea. Our interest rests in the naissance of the idea and how it evolves into an affirmed municipal development policy.

While urban coalitions usually comprise private interest and civil groups that cooperate with local administrations, ideological developers (IDs) form the hard core of the circumstantial coalition currently under investigation; that is, a small group of individuals with limited access to the local administration but who share enthusiasm regarding a certain development idea or initiative. The IDs do not possess property nor invest capital, hence are not property developers. Driven by a moral commitment—rather than tangible needs or profits—the IDs seek the best way to bring their vision to fruition. Since the IDs are not dealing with money-making initiatives, an association with private market bodies is unlikely to happen. In addition, the subject of enthusiasm is not necessarily appealing to existing civil groups. Hence, the IDs seek out influential routes to policy makers. When an alliance with administrators is formed, it is different than the "usual" urban coalition: the economic motivation of its members is vague and the cohesive element for the group is a particular idea as opposed to tangible interests. As a result, such alliances are fundamentally unstable. In addition, whenever the IDs feel the coalition is ineffectual, they have no compunction in switching alliances. The process may bring about changes in the primary vision of the IDs as well as conflicts within their group. However, IDs occasionally manage to accomplish their primary goals, albeit partially. Such informal operations are labeled "retail politics" by Stone (2005), who stresses that despite the haphazard implementation, the devotees may garner victories. Our aim is to point at efficient and ordered characteristics that the circumstantial coalitions adapt.

We claim that in Tel Aviv alone, several IDs' initiatives developed into mature policies-–as in the case of the development of bicycle paths and the recent renewal of Tel Aviv's seaport. Moreover, while Tel Aviv may appear to be a city that is particularly interested in the preservation of urban heritage, the research presented here shows that, in effect, the persistence of IDs is more likely the source of these initiatives. Elsewhere (Alfasi & Fabian, forthcoming), we claim that the preservation of the old city of Jaffa, which is now part of Tel Aviv, resulted from a small group of IDs who pressed the local authority for nearly a decade. In this case, the IDs were three individuals, including: Samuel Yevin, an archeologist, head of the Antiquities Department in

the Prime Minister's office; Eliezer Brutzcus, engineer and urban planner, head of the Research and Survey Division in the Governmental Planning Department; and Marcel Janco, an architect and painter. The coordinated, resourceful action they employed illustrates the leverage IDs may gain within the local government. In London, the regeneration of South Bank, including the transformation of bank-side power station into the spectacular Tate Modern Museum and the development of Coin Street (see Brindley, 2000), could serve as another illustration.

URBAN COALITIONS AND THE ISRAELI ARENA

The dominant paradigm in the field of local politics is *urban regime theory* that models the incorporation of various interests in governing coalitions. In particular, regime analysis deals with the dynamics of building coalitions and managing them. Based on studies carried out in Atlanta (Stone, 1989), and Florida and Dallas (Elkin, 1987), scholars agree that the capacity to govern is not provided by the formal political cycle. Being elected is merely the technical starting point of governing, a necessary yet not sufficient condition to govern. Rather, governing powers in the urban arena are created through the relationship between market forces and political control. Clearly, in the United States, governing powers derive from elected delegates' capacity to enlist a variety of urban actors and form with them deep, lasting, partnerships (Stone, 1993; Jonas, 1993; Cox, 1997; Lauria 1997; Painter, 1997; Kilburn, 2004). Such urban coalitions incorporate private market actors and civic interest groups in local government to create informal, yet influential, arrangements of governance (Sassen, 1994; Fainstein, 1994; Mossberger & Stoker, 2001; Kilburn, 2004). The encounter of business groups and local government administration typify the dynamics in U.S. cities, where these groups are mutually dependent on each other (Elkin, 1987; Stone, 1989; Austin & McCaffrey, 2002).

Comparative studies relate to various aspects of urban regimes, both within the United States (Kantor, Savitch, & Haddock, 1997; Dowding, 2001; Savitch & Kantor, 2002) and between the norms, administrations, and local politics of the United States and Europe or the United Kingdom (Wolman, 1992; DiGaetano & Klemanski, 1993a, 1993b; Atkinson, 1995; Sellers, 2002; DiGaetano & Storm, 2003; Holman, 2007). Some of these studies reveal that unlike the United States, urban coalitions in the United Kingdom are formed over issues that are not necessarily motivated by a financial gain (Bassett, 1996; Mossberger & Stoker, 2001). We claim that such comparison is relevant to the study of urban politics and governance in Israel, and particularly Tel Aviv. As Kirby and Abu-Rass (1999) show, the Israeli political and economic context differs from the United States. Israel is highly centralized, in line with concepts of state structure adopted from European countries. Thus, unlike the financial autonomy of local governments in the United States, the municipal level in Israel is dependent on financial control and support of central government. In particular, the situation in Israel is one that gives the state greater salience in the processes of local development and the legislative frame under which these are carried out. To this, one may add national ownership of land-–as the Israeli Land Authority (ILA) is the owner of about 95% of the state's land, including within the cities—that stresses the need for governmental consent to local development initiatives.[3] As a result, the local business sector in Israel has only limited leverage over local politicians, and urban coalitions remain subject to central impositions and dictates. Hence, the business sector rarely collaborates with local administration, and when it does, it is on a limited and short-term scope. Unlike the United States, long-term stable coalitions of private interests with local administrations are not a common vision in Israel. Instead, there is room in Israeli local politics for partnerships with nongovernmental actors, led by local government administrators. Davies' (2001, 2002, 2003) comparison of United States and United Kingdom reveals comparable findings and leads him to

conclude that as a result of the structural differences, regimes are unlikely to appear in the United Kingdom.[4] Kirby and Abu-Rass (1999) also deduce that central government impact on local levels in Israel is the source of the incompetence of North American growth machine theories for studying urban politics there.

There have been a few limited attempts to examine Israeli urban politics through the paradigm of regime theory (see Hasson, 1996; Menachem, 2005). Our research shows that in addition to economic developers' strategic involvement and to organized civil groups' political impact, Israeli local political and bureaucratic culture grants influential individuals admission to the decision-making process, which enables the creation of ideological developers.

COMMON TRAITS OF IDEOLOGICAL DEVELOPERS (IDs)

According to Niedt (2006), the current "third wave" gentrification is characterized by enthusiastic residents who willingly cooperate with administrators and developers. Still, the role played by nonofficial actors in the invention of urban policies remains unclear. In this study, we are interested in the way policies and governing rationales that are initially not favored by local government officials emerge, and how they strive to gain legitimacy and feasibility. To this end, we utilize the idea of *policy entrepreneurs*, as theorized by King and Roberts (1987), and elaborate on it. Policy entrepreneurs operate "from outside the formal positions of government"; nevertheless, they manage to "introduce, translate, and help implement new ideas into public practice" (Roberts & King, 1991, p. 147). Policy entrepreneurs can be actors in the government or the economy, but they also include public nonprofit groups and other normative-oriented bodies. Very often, policy entrepreneurs are invited by governmental officials to take part in public debates and discussions. An investigation conducted by King and Roberts (1992) regarding the personality profile of policy entrepreneurs reveals their concern for "broad abstract ideas" (p. 178), as well as basic will to cooperate with administrators. Acting from a sense of duty, policy entrepreneurs donate time and skills, and manage to raise innovative, contributive ideas. In particular, King and Roberts (1992) stress that while property and executive entrepreneurs might use ethically questionable means to reach goals and objectives, policy entrepreneurs are usually respectful, open to the views of others, and ethical. Ideological developers are similar in many ways to policy entrepreneurs yet they differ in some essential aspects. Like them, the IDs help to generate new ideas and integrate them into the public arena. In addition, they are fundamentally unorganized and do not wave the conventional flags of struggling for rights or meeting sectoral needs, as do conventional civil groups. However, the IDs are driven by their obsession to a certain issue rather than by a general will to make a contribution. Thus, they cooperate with officials only as long as it is helpful and are always willing to provoke against governmental policies, manipulate administrators, and use every possible measure to promote their idea.

The issue of preservation provides a good opportunity to look at the operation of IDs. Researchers relate to the use of collective memory and built heritage in the processes of urban branding and place manufacturing. On one hand, preservation of built environment could serve as means for articulating urban visions and representing local identity thus could be appealing for both local leadership and the business elite (see Krantz & Schätzl, 1997; Short & Kim, 1998; Hall & Hubbard, 1998; Short, 1999). On the other hand, the launch of preservation policy inevitably casts various restraints on property entrepreneurs as well as urban planning administrations. In addition, it stresses the reliance of municipal officials on private sector actors. While the public is generally interested in preservation, individuals are not keen on financing it, nor can they afford to follow the entire preservation directive. Initiators and businesspeople may be interested in preservation as means for urban renewal, as much as the expectations for the increase of real estate values and consumers attraction reach (Reichl, 1997; Stone, 1989; Newman, 2001).

Urban establishment's role is to navigate between conflicting needs, wills, and resources, and lead the potential contributors toward a functioning consensus. This task requires considerable organization efforts and is not always as rewarding. For this reason, municipal administrations are not always eager to adopt preservation policies and to prepare preservation plans. The IDs in the case study below struggled to create the conditions for their idea to be accepted as an urban policy, and for municipal administrators to be highly committed to its fulfillment.

Tel Aviv's preservation initiative provides an interesting case study when contrasted with a similar case study in Atlanta. Stone (1989) sees the inability of preservation supporters to join the governing coalition in Atlanta as the cause of the failure in Atlanta's preservation policy. In Tel Aviv as well, preservation advocates did not build a stable coalition with the business elite, nor have they attempted to do so. Nevertheless, the IDs—actors who are not part of business sector or civil movements—have managed to create effective partnerships within local government, to use governing tools, and to raise public support in preservation policy. Historic preservation in Tel Aviv is now an affirmed and active policy, with proven success.

Methodological Remarks

The research presented in this paper aims at identifying the IDs that took part in the preservation of modern heritage in Tel Aviv and illustrating their patterns of behavior. The research started with a survey of the background to UNESCO's nomination based on reviewing the municipality's paperwork (plans, working papers, local commissions' decision, etc.) and local newspapers. In addition, we started interviewing the main actors and searched for the involvement of typical IDs. The criteria for selecting the IDs were drawn from the background presented in the first sections of this paper. That is: (a) one or few unorganized individuals, who are not property developers and do not invest capital in the city, (b) actors who manage to influence decisions, (c) people with relatively high personal status and access to administrators, and (d) people who are highly committed to a specific development idea, carry a clear and stable message regarding the subject, and accompany the process for most of the evolution stages.

Once the IDs were selected, the research focused on examining their contribution to the evolution of the preservation initiative from a general idea to an accepted urban policy. In addition, the research aimed at analyzing the means used by the IDs as well as their patterns of behavior and relations with administrators.

The next section begins with the background to the preservation initiative and an introduction of the IDs. The paper then continues with the research's findings.

TEL AVIV'S PRESERVATION INITIATIVE

Jewish architects who studied and practiced architecture at institutions and firms in Europe imported to Palestine the modern architectural language they were exposed to. Stylistic influences originating in the Modern Movement in France, Germany, Belgium, and Italy became prominent in Tel Aviv's new architecture built in the 1930s and 1940s (Szmuk, 1994). The city's rapid expansion in those years[5] made the International Style architecture the dominant architectural feature in the areas built at the time, now referred to as the city center and the old north (Shavit & Biger, 2001; Amit-Cohen, 2005; Azaryahu, 2006). Being noticeably different than the architectural aesthetic that preceded it in Tel Aviv, buildings with oriental influences, the Eclectic Style with its wide range of architectural quotations, and the vertically oriented Art Deco, the International Style with its horizontal emphasis, bare plastered walls, and volumetric appearance established a distinct architectural character to the city (Szmuk, 1994; Elhanani, 1998; Amit-Cohen, 2005).[6]

From the time when Israel was founded as an independent state, in 1948, the city of Tel Aviv, established in 1909 next to old Jaffa, served as the national commercial and financial center (Vilnay, 1965; Shavit & Biger, 2002; Amit-Cohen, 2005; Azaryahu, 2006). Similar to other metropolitan cities, Tel Aviv has witnessed a long period of emigration. Between 1963 and 1988, the city's population decreased by 20%, from its peak with 394,000 inhabitants to only 318,000 inhabitants, respectively (Municipality of Tel-Aviv–Yaffo, 1967, 1995). At the same time, however, the city continued to grow in terms of employees. Employment in industry, commerce, and services soared during this period and Tel Aviv strengthened its place in the lead of economic and financial activity. As a result, residential areas close to the center were deserted by inhabitants as the expanding central business district (CBD) took over residential districts (Schnell & Graicer, 1993, 1994). The abandonment of the city center raised both physical and social problems. The upkeep of residential living spaces deteriorated rapidly from the heavy use of the offices and light industries that had replaced the homeowners. Social services—schools, kindergartens, and community centers—remained disused. Massive commuting produced traffic jams and the CBD suffered from an unrelieved shortage of parking places. As families tended to leave, the remaining inhabitants were mostly the elderly, and the city center population grew older. Although pleased with the economic centrality of Tel Aviv, city planners worried that the continuation of suburbanization processes, coupled with the lack of appropriate housing infrastructure, would eventually dry the city out (Yoskovitch, 1998; Shavit & Biger, 2002; Azaryahu, 2006). This was the background to the crystallization of the ideological developer group as well as a number of city planners' initiatives that led to the maturation of the preservation initiative (see Figure 1).

Urban modernity is somewhat contradictory to the notion of preservation. While modernism is associated with being innovative and moving forward, preservation and conservation are driven by looking backward and promoting values of memory and nostalgia. Moreover, urban preservation is often suggested as a rejection of modernism and a protest against it. These two opposing poles-–modernity and preservation—are also associated with the inherent tension between developers' interests and inhabitants' rights, as well as the gap between professional, elitist reasoning of development and a publicly sensitive and collaborative process of planning (Grant, 1994). Preservation of Tel Aviv's Modern legacy, thus, offers an unusual case for demonstrating the combination of urban modernity and conservation. We would now turn to the IDs, explore their motivation and then examine the origins of their commitment to the Modern legacy of Tel Aviv.

The IDs of Modern Architecture in Tel Aviv

The group that would change the way inhabitants and planners conceive of Tel Aviv started with two individuals, an artist-–the sculptor Dani Karavan, and an art researcher—Dr. Michael (Micha) Levin.[7] The two, each in his own way, were individuals with high political capital, accessible to administrators and decision makers. While Karavan was not officially part of the local administration, Levin later joined the municipal administration. He was the director of Tel Aviv Museum of Art from 1986 to 1990, and served as Mayor Lahat's consultant from 1990 to 1993. By the end of the 1970s, without any appointment or funding, the two independently became aware of the poor architectural condition of Tel Aviv. As they recall, acknowledging the importance and meaning of Modern building in Tel Aviv—commonly considered ugly and insignificant—developed among them coincidentally (Levin, 2003; Karavan, 2006). Apparently, the trigger to the whole episode was a traveling exhibition sponsored by the Goethe Institute that was dedicated to the architecture of the Bauhaus school. The exhibition, held at Tel Aviv Museum of Art in 1980, aimed to elucidate this particular chapter of German culture, and linking the Bauhaus school to Tel Aviv, as the exhibition's host city, was marginal (Azaryahu, 2006). Karavan and Levin, however, admit they were thrilled to discover the importance of the Bauhaus

FIGURE 1

Preservation Area and UNESCO's Nomination Area in the City of Tel Aviv

school to the architecture of Tel Aviv, and, even more so, the uniqueness of Tel Aviv as having one of the largest collections of Bauhaus buildings in the world (Levin, 2003).[8] They immersed themselves in all concerning the Bauhaus school in general and in its manifestation in Tel Aviv in particular. Having access to the Mayor of Tel Aviv, they convinced him to consult with experts. Dr. Dieter Ronte, then the director of the Museum of Modern Art in Vienna was invited to Tel Aviv and confirmed the surprising fact that the dull, exhausted built environment of Tel Aviv was in fact an important cultural asset (Levin, 2003).

A few years later, in 1984, Michael Levin held his exhibition "White City" at the Tel Aviv Museum of Art. The exhibition was also born unintentionally: the museum's director was interested in marking the 75th anniversary of Tel Aviv, and heard of Levin's interest in the city's Modern legacy. The exhibition was the first to present the small houses of Tel Aviv as belonging to the cultural heritage of modernism, and especially Bauhaus.[9] The exhibition had a strong impact, both locally and internationally, as it was also held at the Jewish Museum in New York and at the Magnes Museum in Berkeley, California.[10] The main message of the exhibition was that these Modern buildings were of a significant potential value and that the need for conservation was urgent. Indeed, a review of the exhibition at the Jewish Museum published in the *New York Times* magazine noted that "Economic problems and indifference have combined to turn Tel Aviv's older sections into something other than the glittering Modernist utopias that they once were,"

and that "Many of the buildings have not only aged poorly, they been altered unsympathetically." Yet, the exhibition managed to convey that ". . . these buildings, whatever their problems, are significant historical works" (Goldberger, 1984).

About the same period, Dani Karavan created Kikar Levana (in Hebrew: white square)—a large sculpture located in a park overlooking the city of Tel Aviv. Inaugurated in 1988, Kikar Levana is "an homage to the people that built the city of Tel Aviv, also called The White City."[11] In the catalogue of Kikar Levana, Levin related to Tel Aviv as hosting "the largest group of Bauhaus buildings" (Azaryahu, 2006), which juxtaposed the White City metaphor with the poor condition and appearance of Tel Aviv in the late 1980s. Azaryahu himself sees in Levin's White City exhibition and in Karavan's Kikar Levana the seeds of the White City myth of Tel Aviv—one of the numerous myths that make up the city.

It appears that the exhibition and the sculpture marked the formation of the IDs as an active entity. According to the information we present below, from this point on the pair was highly devoted to the publication and acknowledgement of Tel Aviv's Modern legacy. At the time, conservation was not yet a policy in Tel Aviv, and the Tel Aviv municipality did not know what to do with the unexpected asset that had been discovered in its midst. As elaborated in the next section, the two worked to rally politicians and administrators to their cause and to transform the undisputed recognition of the municipal asset to an actual strategy. They already received support from the director of the city's largest museum and had managed to create public and professional interest in their case. However, before we continue and examine how they garnered support from the urban establishment, we examine the other axis from which the preservation initiative developed: the *Lev Ha'Ir* (City Heart) plan.

The Lev Ha'Ir Plan

In the mid 1970s, Tel Aviv's district planning authorities prepared *The Metropolitan Outline Plan* in an effort to resolve the problems created by the decrease in population coupled with the increase of business and light industry in the city center. The plan promoted three goals: (1) developing secondary employment centers that would relieve the pressure on the metropolitan CBD, (2) directing the development of the CBD toward the metropolitan highway at the east end of Tel Aviv and developing new routes to improve accessibility to the CBD, and (3) reinstating residence in central Tel Aviv and restoring the communal atmosphere to the city center (Shavit & Biger, 2002; Davidov, 2004). Based on *The Metropolitan Plan*, several local plans were launched that defined employment clusters, public parks, and neighborhood centers.

The Lev Ha'Ir plan was such a local plan. Conceived in 1981 by a private planning office hired by the municipality and the Ministry of Housing, the Lev Ha'Ir plan presented a detailed plan for the center of Tel Aviv. In this plan, the preservation idea was launched as a means to create the conditions for the area's physical and social revival and increase residential usage. Preservation of valuable buildings was offered among other principles that could encourage the urban renewal process, such as changing the organization of traffic and parking in the area, up-zoning residence lots, and obstructing the infiltration of the CBD into residential buildings. According to this plan, the municipality would force offices out of tenements, would direct passing traffic toward designated main routes, and would offer incentives—reduced municipal rates and loans for renovation—for new residents (Mazor, 1987; Davidov, 2004). As the planners were unaware of the value of International Style buildings, they linked the preservation idea with the buildings referred to as Eclectic, which portray close resemblance to traditional 19th-century European architecture. The planning team listed about 300 Eclectic buildings and divided them to three categories, ranging from strict preservation to partial conservation, that is, from unalterable buildings to slightly amended buildings, and buildings that could be supplemented with new

floors (Davidov, 2004; Santo, 2004).[12] For Lev Ha'Ir planners, preservation was a means to attract homeowners to the area as well as for the recovery of the weary built inventory. Soon, the IDs sharpened the conflicts between this practical attitude and their ideal. We now return to the IDs and survey their way toward consensus.

THE IDs AND THE FORMATION OF PRESERVATION POLICY IN TEL AVIV

Association with Influential Actors

The two IDs—Karavan and Levin—searched for administrators that would identify with their interest in Tel Aviv's Modern heritage. It appears that the attempt to associate with influential actors—professionals, officials, and journalists--was a major component of their strategy. As a part of this effort, they began to exchange ideas with Lev Ha'Ir planners. However, it soon became clear that this dialogue was not leading to an effective partnership. Lev Ha'Ir planners looked for a consensual solutions, while the value of the Modern architecture did not appear to be ripe for effective urban renewal (Davidov, 2004). An even more fundamental obstacle was the fact that the planners viewed preservation as a tool for attracting development to the area. According to the planners' calculations, the residential units in the Lev Ha'Ir district should increase by 25%. Accordingly, they intended to enable three- and four-story high buildings to have an additional one to two stories, which would finance preservation and renovation activities (Mazor, 1987). As this view was unacceptable to the IDs, their cooperation with the Lev Ha'Ir planners did not bear fruit. Thus, while the local outline plan was authorized only years later—part of it in 1997 and the other in 2001—the renewal project began, on a practical level, in the late 1980s, without any association with the IDs and their concept of Modern heritage (Levin, 2003; Davidov, 2004).

The episode with the planners of Lev Ha'Ir plan, however, highlighted two principles that shaped the ID's viewpoint and policy. The first was the claim that unlike other assets worthy of preservation and conservation, Tel Aviv could not boast of monuments and the like. Rather, as Levin (2003) stated, "Tel Aviv's asset was the large mass of Modern buildings located in the city and the resulting unique urban fabric that these buildings created." The second, which resulted from this, was the stance that massive development in the Lev Ha'Ir district would irreversibly harm the uniqueness of the concentration of Modern buildings. Thus, the major issue on their platform included rejection of financing preservation by means of additional stories to buildings marked as worthy of preservation (Levin, 2003; Szmuk, 2003; Karavan, 2006).

Influencing the Media and Public Opinion

Influencing public opinion through the media was another strategy the IDs employed. To this end, they initiated an alliance with the editors of *Ha'Ir* (*The City*) Magazine, a widespread local weekly. Following the Lev Ha'Ir plan, in the early 1990s, *Ha'Ir* Magazine originated the idea of testing the effects of preservation by inviting architects to design preservation of houses in the city center. However, in line with the Lev Ha'Ir plan, *Ha'Ir* Magazine's editors wished to test the effect of additional stories in the city center. With the full collaboration of the city engineer and municipal administration, the editors chose Ha'Gilboa Street, a small street at the hub of the city center district with 18 houses of three to four stories of Bauhaus, Eclectic, and late Modern styles. The houses were raffled among architects, who suggested architectural plans for an additional two to three stories and the general preservation plan for each building. In the exhibition, *Ha'Gilboa Street: A Case Study*, the architects' plans and detailed models were presented and showed buildings before and after preservation.[13] While the exhibition stressed the emerging recognition in the Modernistic buildings as an important urban asset, the accompanying commentary by the

architects reflected the controversy associated with newly added stories to buildings in the City Heart district. For example, the participating architects Yaski and Sivan stated that their plan "does not represent the normal standard employed by us, but rather follows the organizers' directives" (Zandberg, 1990), and the architects Goldenberg and Buchman insisted on adding only one story to the three-story house they were planning, claiming that the existing street section should be maintained (Zandberg, 1990, p. 15). *Ha'Ir* Magazine reported a boisterous argument that broke out in the symposium that accompanied the exhibition. As city engineer and Lev Ha'Ir planners argued for additional building, Karavan interrupted from the audience and cried "We are facing a disaster. ... We must ask the world for help in preserving this unique city. It is not ours to destroy it, it's an international asset" (Zandberg, 1990, p. 13). Within several years, the IDs had indeed managed to create international interest in the Modern architecture of Tel Aviv and recruit international support for the preservation initiative.

Penetrating into the Municipal Establishment

The third and most effective strategy to fuel interest in the city's Modern architecture was aimed directly at Tel Aviv's mayor. Relying on the success of the White City exhibition, the ID pair suggested examining whether preserving Modern buildings—without additional building rights—would be recognized as a valuable cultural asset. As the two had the support of influential individuals, including the city museums' directors, and access to the mayor, they managed to pass a municipal decision, stating that the city would purchase five buildings in the Bauhaus Style and use them as showcases of the preservation effort.

The decision—to purchase houses and preserve them with municipal funds—was never executed. However, it created an opportunity of which the IDs took full advantage. Since the high expenses associated with this experiment caused the mayor and city engineer to hesitate in its execution, the IDs contacted the Tel Aviv Development Fund (TADF), a municipal firm adjacent to the municipality (Levin, 2003; Karavan, 2006). As a first step, TADF's director agreed to finance the work of an experienced architect who would choose the buildings that best exemplified the Modern style. While urban administration was slow in hiring personnel for new and temporal tasks of preservation and conservation, TADF was a much more flexible body, hence fit for collaboration. The IDs actually chose the preservation architect (PA) for the TADF, and throughout the project she remained highly devoted to their ideas (Szmuk, 2003; Karavan, 2006). Within a short while, she was responsible for two separate tasks: the first was to select five buildings for the preservation experiment, and the second was to collect data for an extensive exhibition on the Bauhaus architecture in Tel Aviv. This effectual coalition, then, collated the mayor and city engineer with the TADF, yet remained exterior to the municipal administration. Nevertheless, it proved to be an effective start (Levin, 2003; Szmuk, 2003; Karavan, 2006).

The beginning of the PA's work at the TADF, in early 1990, marked the evolution of the general preservation idea into a concrete initiative. While her directives were to prepare an exhibition concerning Modern architecture in Tel Aviv and to find a few demonstrative buildings for preservation, she soon broadened this task to conduct a comprehensive survey of the International Style architecture in Tel Aviv. Within one year, the PA gathered extensive information concerning the planning, construction, and ownership of houses that belonged to the International Style. The collected data sharpened the conflict between the IDs' and municipal policy, especially with respect to the municipal tendency to allow additional construction to preserved houses. The IDs claimed that the existing preservation list prepared by the Lev Ha'Ir planners was an irrelevant tool to deal with the relatively uniform urban fabric revealed throughout the survey: first, the listed buildings did not include the Modern style houses, and second, it failed to spot the urban fabric as a whole and handled the chosen 300 houses like individual monuments (Szmuk, 2003).

Moreover, the Office of City Planning divided the area into five subdistricts and promoted five different outline plans, in which preservation played a marginal role. In contrast, the IDs and a growing group of advocates thought the time was ripe for putting Modern culture and the Bauhaus legacy at the center of renewal efforts. They exerted a lot of pressure on the city engineer via the city mayor and were successful in garnering his support. However, they failed to convince him that additional building in the city center was wrong, and the detailed planning continued.

The ID's frustration led to a clash with the city engineer's office. The tension developed after a meeting at the city engineer's office in the presence of the PA and two senior administrators from the Office of City Planning. The meeting was called at the request of the IDs and was intended to see if the outline plans that were still under consideration could take the Bauhaus structures into account. However, the seniors from the municipal planning office had only then realized that without their knowledge and for almost a year, the TADF had conducted a thorough survey in the Lev Ha'Ir region. They were both amazed and offended, and hence had difficulty relating to the PA's findings. The PA was frustrated and disappointed as well. The rift between the IDs and the Office of the City Engineer lasted for some time (Levin, 2003; Szmuk, 2003).

Feeding Data to the Municipal Establishment

When the PA completed the survey of Modern buildings in the center of Tel Aviv, she reconnected with the Office of City Planning and offered to make use of the comprehensive data, which included original plans and detailed information concerning more that 1,300 Modern structures in Tel Aviv. As part of the hesitant collaboration that commenced, the city planners agreed to enlarge the number of listed buildings. At first, a minor addition of 50 structures was made to the list (Santo, 2004). But soon, at the beginning of 1991, the IDs convinced the city engineer to include the surveyed information in the city's computer system. The city had finally allocated funds for the preservation issue, and the PA--still employed by the TADF—was invited to help (Szmuk, 2003). Resulting from this activity, in effect all 1,300 International Style buildings were listed in the municipal database and were primed for preservation activities. At this point, a new circumstantial coalition was gradually instituted, this time between the IDs and the Office of the City Engineer. The PA and IDs enjoyed more intensive collaboration with the city engineer, who was approaching the end of his term (Levin, 2003). As research by Amit-Cohen shows, at this point public as well as professional recognition in the value of International Style architecture was also growing.

In March 1991, the amendment to the National Law of Planning and Building was accepted, ordering local planning authorities to include a preservation committee, to prepare a conservation plan, and set guidelines for a preservation appendix (amendment number 31, regulation proposal 2045, 12.3.1991, also reported in Amit-Cohen, 2005, p. 292). The PA was asked to help out, and she was given a small workplace in the Office of City Planning along with the assistance of a graphic designer, even though she was still employed by the TADF (Szmuk, 2003; Santo, 2004). However, becoming part of the municipality entailed a compromise: the PA was compelled to grade the buildings in terms of their importance in order to allow degrees of construction amendments and additional building.

The very presence of the PA in the Office of City Planning had practical effects. City planners began to consult with her whenever inhabitants and developers appealed with changes to buildings that were on her list. In addition, the PA and IDs collaborated with the Office of the City Engineer on the preparation of an exhibition, which grew to a sizeable event. Gradually, the conservation viewpoint was integrated into the planning administration. Since early 1993, the PA was employed by the municipality and TADF together, and, by 1994, she became a full municipal worker. However, the IDs still wanted a stronger commitment to the city's Modern architecture.

This would come, they hoped, through widespread public recognition of the International Style buildings as an irreplaceable asset.

Increasing Public Recognition

By 1994, urban preservation was integrated into the planning process. The PA worked within the Office of City Planning on several outline plans,[14] and the circumstantial coalition that included the IDs and the Office of City Planning had proven to be efficient. In addition, the preservation initiative was the catalyst for a White City celebration that included an exhibition on the Modern Movement's[15] contribution to Tel Aviv along with a farewell tribute to the departing city mayor. This celebration included various activities, all of which cemented the importance of the preservation efforts: the city municipality rented the distinguished Ha'Bima Theater building, to house an exhibition on Modern architecture; Tel Aviv Museum of Art held an art and photographic exhibition related to the Bauhaus movement; Bauhaus and Modern culture were also the subjects of a film festival that took place in the Tel Aviv Cinematheque, and a Bauhaus-style ballet company from Düsseldorf performed in Tel Aviv; Levin had expanded his White City exhibition from a decade ago and held it in a Modern preserved hall in the city center; and finally, an extensive signpost campaign took place in the city to point out significant Bauhaus buildings.

Tel Aviv seemed to be flooded with images of Modern, especially Bauhaus, culture. However, the IDs wanted more than local recognition in the importance of Bauhaus architecture. They wanted broader recognition in the form of UNESCO's nomination of Tel Aviv as World Heritage that would obligate the city to preserve its unique urban fabric (Karavan, 2006). To this end, UNESCO's Director-General, Federico Mayor, was invited to Tel Aviv to attend the primary event of the White City celebration.

Pressing UNESCO's Nomination

The effort to receive UNESCO's recognition for the White City of Tel Aviv as World Heritage was a controversial matter within the municipal administration. Israel did not yet adhere to the World Heritage Convention, whose formal ratification was only in October 1999, and was not committed to protect built heritage. Moreover, the IDs suspected that the recently appointed city engineer might see the shortcomings of such a nomination, and especially the limits on further planning and development of the White City, as exceeding its possible advantages. It was precisely these disadvantages that found favor with the IDs, as a nomination as World Heritage could limit extensive development (Levin, 2003; Karavan, 2006). All the more so, since the newly elected mayor and city engineer were less cooperative with the IDs than their predecessors.

As soon as Israel joined UNESCO, Israeli delegates prepared a tentative list of nearly 20 cultural and natural landscape sites. The IDs proceeded in what was now their customary pattern of action: exerting personal leverage on the critical decision makers. They contacted the group of Israeli delegates and ensured that the White City was included in their list. Then, they made sure the White City appeared in the short list. Again, they were challenged by administrators: as the municipality's support and commitment were necessary for the inclusion of the White City in the short list, and the new city engineer remained reluctant, they managed to contact the new mayor and entice him with the potential political reward hidden in a UNESCO nomination. The closer they approached their goal, the more bitter their struggle became. Close to a month before the formal nomination was made, the PA was dismissed from her position in the Office of the City Engineer, although she continued to serve as a freelancer and assisted in the preparation of the paperwork prior to the nomination and afterward (Szmuk, 2003). The nomination consisted of

three strict limitation areas and a surrounding buffer zone, with weaker limitations (see Figure 1 above). The Office of the City Engineer struggled to enlarge the buffer zones at the expense of the strictly monitored areas (Szmuk, 2003; Levin, 2003).

Three years after UNESCO's nomination, the assimilation of preservation policy into municipal bodies is not complete. The subject is laden with conflicts, most of them originating from the major pressures involved in the development of inner-city areas. While the influence of the initial IDs have weakened over time, the formation of civil movement bodies with similar goals has risen in their place. The Society for Preservation of Israel Heritage Sites, for example, is leading the recent struggle against the municipality of Tel Aviv, which is currently striving to change the structure of Heichal Ha'Tarbut, the large performing arts center located in the buffer zone of the White City. On the other hand, groups of property owners resist additional building rights for Modern buildings in the preservation buffer zones.

DISCUSSION

Governing the contemporary city requires bringing together private interests and resources as well as civil movements that bear influence on the urban arena. However, the case study presented here demonstrates that urban policy may be influenced by innovative ideas that arise by individuals from within and without the municipal government. Thus, the formation of local policy is not merely the reflection of existing powers and interests. Rather, the local knowledge, persistence, and resourcefulness of single actors that operate in the urban arena facilitate the integration of new ideas into political systems. The IDs gain access to decision-making nodes and have the opportunity to promote their viewpoints. While the initiatives of the IDs seem to aim at creating common benefits, in addition to gaining prestige for themselves, their initiatives are not supported by business-led actors or widespread civil organizations. Nevertheless, they manage to break through to the administration by making use of personal leverage and resourcefulness.

The preservation of Modern architecture in Tel Aviv provides an example of IDs working intensely toward a common issue for a relatively long time period. Based on this case study, an initial identification of the IDs and their pattern of behavior became possible. First, the IDs are a small and unorganized group. They do not operate on behalf of an economic or civil body and do not promote the interests of a defined public. Rather, they act to their own accord, evidently for the interest of the public and for individual eminence. As part of that, they appear to be driven by an enduring commitment—which may also look like an obsession—to their idea. Second, the IDs are individuals with high personal capital, which results from personal achievements (as in the case of the current IDs) or wealth. As a result, they are accessible to politicians, businesspeople, and public figures and bring into play unique knowledge and means. Nevertheless, there is doubt whether their activity is driven by the promotion of their own economic interests. In the case study presented here the IDs did not invest money nor possess property in Tel Aviv, and thus were not financially interested in the preservation of the White City. Third, and resulting from the first two, the issue they promote is rather elitist—in the sense that it is not expressed in the action of common civil groups nor can it be easily adopted by them. Furthermore, although they present their case as if it were for the common good, they choose to promote their ideas via the circumstantial coalitions they build with local administrators rather than enlist civil organizations.

As the IDs cannot promote their issue via private developers and NGOs, they need to search for alternatives. They build circumstantial coalitions to facilitate their influence over the administration. The circumstantial coalition is an issue-based coalition navigated by the IDs, assembled and disbanded according to their needs. The IDs utilize the circumstantial coalitions to employ a variety of strategies. The above case study highlights at least five different channels of influence employed by the IDs. First and primarily, the IDs lobbied professionals and city administrators,

in an attempt to explain the rationale of their argument and persuade the relevant experts. Thus, the IDs contacted planners (Lev Ha'Ir and city planners), public figures (museum directors), and officials (TADF's director), and succeeded in ensuring that the TADF finance the work of the PA and approach the municipal administration. The IDs promoted Dr. Dieter Ronte's visit in Tel Aviv and then used his positive opinion to back their claims regarding the necessity to preserve the local Modern heritage. The White City exhibitions were used in the same manner. The ultimate professional achievement, however, was the UNESCO nomination of the White City as World Heritage and the legitimization it created.

Second, the IDs utilized their personal status to access and influence elected officials in an attempt to impact decision making. In the case above, they exploited Karavan's former acquaintance and personal capital to pressure the mayor, thus circumventing the city engineer and professional administration. In addition, they managed to convince TADF's director to hire the PA and pointed at the chosen architect.

Third, the IDs worked to create operative data and to feed them into the databases of the municipal administration. The PA was hired to pick five houses worthy of preservation, but enlarged her work and conducted a thorough survey. When amendment number 31 to the Planning and Building Law from 1991 obliged local planning authorities to prepare a conservation plan and set guidelines for a preservation appendix, the database was in place. This was also the case when the State of Israel adopted the World Heritage Convention in 1999; the IDs exploited this opportunity and pressed to include the White City in the preservation list.

Fourth, the IDs worked to educate the public and inform their knowledge. In the above case, the IDs raised the White City exhibitions, the first in 1984 and the second under the auspices of the municipality in 1994. They contributed considerably to the Bauhaus events in 1994 and to the accumulation of knowledge regarding Tel Aviv's Modern architecture.

Fifth, the IDs used the media and public opinion to gain support for their ideas and provoke against municipal policy. To this end, they attempted to join forces with *Ha'Ir* magazine in an effort to criticize the municipality. While using the media is considered a necessary channel for influencing public opinion, in the above case it proved to be a marginal tool, as the IDs did not accept the magazine editors' view and were not willing to compromise at that stage. They preferred the above channels of influencing professionals and decision makers, and made their impact on public opinion through the education channel rather than through the media.

The current research shows that IDs remained extremely calculating in their alliances with professionals, administrators, and elected officials. They cooperated with their partners only as long as it was effective and did not hesitate to abandon their colleagues to advance their cause. The promotion of the UNESCO nomination is one example of the calculating nature of their work, as it helped them enforce international limits on the development of the city center.

The IDs in the above case study did not manage to complete their vision, as the city did not fully adopt their notion of preservation and does permit additional construction and various amendments to Modern buildings. Nevertheless, their story demonstrates the crucial impact that single, committed yet unorganized actors may have on the formation of policy in present-day cities.

ENDNOTES

1 See Sharkansky (2004), regarding the conflicts of preservation in Jerusalem.

2 The *International Style* was termed by Henry Russell Hitchcock and Philip Johnson (1932) as an architectural style "which exists throughout the world, is unified and inclusive" (p. 35). The international style encompasses the works of famous architects, such as Le Corbusier, Mies van der Rohe, Walter Gropius, and many others, as well as the architectural legacy of institutions such as the famous Bauhaus School in Germany.

3 Although ILA owns only 44.4% of Tel Aviv-Jaffa's area, the municipality is the owner of another 24.8% of the city's area (Alterman, 1997).

4 Holman's (2007) study in Portsmouth shows that, although in the local government in the United Kingdom the regimes may be rare, they are still significant.

5 In 1930 there where 3,767 buildings in Tel Aviv, whereas in 1947–1948 the city included 8,055 buildings (Municipality of Tel-Aviv–Yaffo, 1952).

6 About the International Style building in Tel Aviv, see: www.white-city.co.il/english/index.html.

7 Since this case is an illustration of a general idea, we chose to identify only the two main IDs by names. Other individuals that were involved in the formation of preservation policy are addressed according to their official positions and roles.

8 Karavan grew up in the center of Tel Aviv and learned to appreciate the unique built environment. In addition, both Karavan and Levin were familiar with ideas of modernism in art in general and with the Bauhaus school in particular.

9 Michael Levin's first interest was in the manifestation of the Bauhaus in Israel in general. Hence, he included in the exhibition photos from other Israeli cities besides Tel Aviv. Later, he refined his interest yet continued to use the extensive original materials (Levin, 2003).

10 The Jewish Museum of New York hosted the White City exhibition from October 17, 1984 through February 17, 1985. Judah L. Magnes Museum of Berkeley, California, hosted the exhibition from June 2 to October 20, 1985 (according to information received from the museums and verified by Levin, 2003).

11 For a presentation of the sculpture, see the artist's website: www.danikaravan.com.

12 Amit-Cohen (2005, p. 292) distinguishes between preservation, that is without any changes to buildings, and conservation, which means that buildings may change according to the city's needs and its renovation process.

13 The exhibition took place from April 30 to May 5, 1990.

14 Preservation was enforced via an amendment to plan no. 2650a from 1992 that included 'Listed Buildings' and a new outline plan, and no. 2650b that included detailed zoning and preservation directives. The outline plan was finally approved in 2004.

15 The exhibition organizers chose to name the event "The Bauhaus Exhibition," for marketing reasons, despite its inaccuracy due to the broad range of modernistic influences on local architecture.

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